Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/226353
Authors: 
Kersting, Jan
Duscha, Vicki
Weitzel, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] The Energy Journal [ISSN:] 0195-6574 [Volume:] 38 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 22-42
Abstract: 
Game-theoretic models of international cooperation on climate change come to very different results regarding the stability of the grand coalition of all countries, depending on the stability concept used. In particular, the core-stability concept produces an encouraging result that does not seem to be supported by reality. We extend the game-theoretic model based on this concept by introducing macroeconomic effects of emission reduction measures in multiple countries. The computable general equilibrium model DART and damage functions from the RICE model are used to quantify the theoretical model. Contrary to the classical model, we find that, under damages in the IPCC range, the core of the resulting cooperative game is empty and no stable global agreement exists. This is mainly due to fossil fuel exporting countries, which are negatively affected by lower fossil fuel prices resulting from emission reduction measures.
Subjects: 
game theory
cooperation
climate change
core
stability
macroeconomic effects
JEL: 
Q54
Q31
Q35
C72
C70
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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