Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/226340 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 07/2020
Verlag: 
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU), Trier
Zusammenfassung: 
Employment protection legislation may affect the degree of substitutability among different types of labour contracts by changing the individuals sorting into jobs and firms screening in and out jobs. Using administrative data, we document this substitutability in the context of a labour market reform that changed the informative content of individual dismissals and provided incentives to training contracts in Italy in 2012. We present and simulate a model that shows that individual's and firm's behaviour have important implications for the impact of policies that lower firing costs. A more flexible employment protection legislation regime combined with incentives to training contracts reduces inefficiencies of job sorting and screening due to asymmetric information.
Schlagwörter: 
Human Capital
Employment Protection Legislation
Asymmetric-information
JEL: 
J24
J63
J68
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
2.65 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.