Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/226299 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8597
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Who gets elected to political office? The negative selection hypothesis posits that the inherently dishonest run for office, expecting to earn political rent. Alternatively, the positive selection hypothesis suggests that individuals join politics to make a difference. Developing country politicians are frequently stereotyped as embodiments of the negative selection hypothesis. Using survey and experimental data covering village councils in rural West Bengal, we find that inexperienced village council politicians are less dishonest and more pro-social than ordinary citizens. Our findings also suggest that this idealism wears off with time.
Subjects: 
selection into politics
politician quality
corruption
experiments
behavioural games
JEL: 
C93
O12
O53
Z18
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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