Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/226183 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 06/2020
Verlag: 
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU), Trier
Zusammenfassung: 
Trade unions distort a profit-maximising firm's input choice. The nature of the resulting inefficiency depends on whether there are wage negotiations or there is efficient bargaining. Moreover, trade unions redistribute income and thereby affect welfare. If firms also pursue Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) objectives, input choices may be distorted already in the absence of collective bargaining. Adopting a positive perspective, we show that CSR objectives, which induce a firm to expand production, have ambiguous wage and employment consequences in case of wage negotiations and raise employment if there is efficient bargaining. Importantly from a normative vantage point, such CSR objectives make a welfare-enhancing role of trade unions more likely in the presence of wage negotiations. The reverse is true in case of efficient bargaining.
Schlagwörter: 
Corporate Social Responsibility
Efficient Bargaining
Trade Unions
Wage Bargaining
Welfare
JEL: 
D60
J51
L31
M14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
643.38 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.