Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/225515 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
GLO Discussion Paper No. 700
Publisher: 
Global Labor Organization (GLO), Essen
Abstract: 
I develop a dynamic version of the competitive search model with adverse selection in Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010). My model allows for an analysis of the effects of firm learning on labor market efficiency in the presence of search frictions. I find that firm learning increases relative expected earnings in high-ability jobs and, thereby, enhances imitation incentives of low-ability workers. The net effect on the aggregate expected match surplus and unemployment is indeterminate a priori. Numerical results show that firm learning does not increase labor market efficiency.
Subjects: 
job search
on-the-job effort
asymmetric information
learning
JEL: 
D82
D83
J64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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