Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/225231
Autor:innen: 
Shekhar, Shiva
Thomes, Tim Paul
Datum: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 351
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the effects of passive backward acquisitions in their efficient upstream supplier on downstream firms' ability to collude in a dynamic game of price competition with homogeneous goods. We find that passive backward acquisitions impede downstream collusion. The main driver of our finding is that a passive backward acquisition secures an acquirer from zero continuation profits after a breakdown of collusion. This anti-collusive effect cannot be outweighed by a lower collusive price that is set by the cartel to increase the acquirer's profit from its claim on the upstream margin.
Schlagwörter: 
Tacit collusion
passive backward acquisitions
Bertrand competition
JEL: 
D43
L13
L40
L81
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-350-6
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
597.69 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.