Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/225063 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Governance [ISSN:] 1468-0491 [Volume:] 33 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 191-208
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken
Abstract: 
This article advances our understanding of differences in hybrid stability by going beyond existing regime typologies that separate the study of political institutions from the study of economic institutions. It combines the work of Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast (NWW) on varieties of social orders with the literature on political and economic regime typologies and dynamics to understand hybrid regimes as Limited Access Orders (LAOs) that differ in the way dominant elites limit access to political and economic resources. Based on a measurement of political and economic access applied to seven post‐Soviet states, the article identifies four types of LAOs. Challenging NWW's claim, it shows that hybrid regimes can combine different degrees of political and economic access to sustain stability. Our typology allows to form theoretical expectations about the kinds of political and/or economic changes that will move different types of LAOs toward more openness or closure.
Subjects: 
Political Economy
JEL: 
P4
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.