Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/224828
Authors: 
Weigel, Jonathan
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series No. 20-202
Abstract: 
This paper provides evidence from a fragile state that citizens demand more of a voice in the government when it tries to tax them. I examine a field experiment randomizing property tax collection across 356 neighborhoods of a large Congolese city. The tax campaign was the first time most citizens had been registered by the state or asked to pay formal taxes. It raised property tax compliance from 0.1%in control to 11.5% in treatment. It also increased political participation by about 5 percentage points (31%): citizens in taxed neighborhoods were more likely to attend townhall meetings hosted by the government or to submit evaluations of its performance. To participate in these ways, the average citizen incurred costs equal to their daily household income, and treated citizens spent 43% more than control. Treated citizens also positively updated about the provincial government, perceiving more revenue, less leakage, and a greater responsibility to provide public goods. The results suggest that broadening the tax base has a 'participation dividend,' a key idea in historical accounts of the emergence of inclusive governance in early modern Europe and a common justification for donor support of tax programs in weak states.
Subjects: 
Taxation
State capacity
Political participation
Tax bargaining
D.R. Congo
Field experiment
JEL: 
H20
P48
D73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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