Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/224636
Authors: 
Huesmann, Katharina
Wambach, Achim
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2020: Gender Economics
Abstract: 
Many markets ban monetary transfers. Rather than exogenously imposing this constraint, we introduce discrimination-freeness as a desideratum based on egalitarian objectives. Discrimination-freeness requires that an agent's object assignment is independent of his wealth. We show that money cannot be used to Pareto-improve ordinal and money-free assignments without violating discrimination-freeness. Furthermore, if a discrimination-free assignment of objects and money is implementable then the respective object assignment is also implementable without money. Once money can be used outside a market designer's control, further restrictions than only money-freeness might be required to address discrimination concerns.
Subjects: 
repugnance
inequality
market design
matching markets
JEL: 
D47
D63
H42
I00
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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