Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224622 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2020: Gender Economics
Publisher: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
The growing popularity of fintechs has led the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to publish considerations about the effects of this emerging industry on stability and efficiency in the financial sector. Against this background, this paper compares the effects of competition and collaboration between banks and fintechs on stability and efficiency. Using a partial equilibrium model and a general equilibrium model with moral hazard between investors and the financial sector based on Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2017), this paper shows that cooperation between banks and fintechs increases stability and efficiency compared to the case of a competitive equilibrium. The findings are robust to changes in bargaining power within the financial sector but depend critically on contestable loan markets.
Subjects: 
fintech
bigtech
financial stability
general equilibrium
JEL: 
G21
G23
G28
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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