Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224598 
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Title: 

How Long-Term Contracts can Mitigate Inefficient Renegotiation Arising Due to Loss Aversion

The document was removed on behalf of the author(s)/ the editor(s).

Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2020: Gender Economics
Publisher: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Subjects: 
Incomplete Contracts
Behavioral Contract Theory
Reference points
Holdup
Renegotiation
JEL: 
D86
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
The document was removed on behalf of the author(s)/ the editor(s) on: June 14, 2021


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