Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22435
Authors: 
Drosdowski, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapiere des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Hannover 323
Abstract: 
The article examines conditions, under which the degree of democratization influences environmental policy outcomes, with a given resource endowments' heterogeneity as a crucial feature of a politico-economic process. We develop an OLG model with pollution as an aggregate externality. The decisive voter chooses redistribution contributing to abatement financing. By comparing the optimal taxation under alternative political regimes we analyze their implications for environment, efficiency and growth. We find that left regimes, choosing more progressive redistribution, maintain better environmental quality, which supports empirical research. Inequality does not appear to be harmful for the environment, and it dampens the effect of democracy imperfections on redistribution.
Subjects: 
Pollution
Political Economy
Inequality
Redistribution
Growth
JEL: 
Q58
D72
D63
D31
Q53
H23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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