Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22410 
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dc.contributor.authorHomburg, Stefanen
dc.contributor.authorLohse, Timen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:59:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:59:24Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22410-
dc.description.abstractAccording to a widely held belief, ?all who are able to work, should work?. We consider this statement within a framework of non-linear taxation. The crucial difference between our model and the standard model is that the government can distinguish between productive persons and the disabled. A general proposition regarding the design of tax-transfer-schemes under such partial information is derived. Moreover, it is shown that unemployment on the side of the productive poor may still be optimal.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cHannoveren
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeitrag |x298en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelI38en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordOptimal Taxationen
dc.subject.keywordEmploymenten
dc.subject.keywordPovertyen
dc.subject.keywordWelfareen
dc.titleOptimal Tax-Transfer-Schemes under Partial Information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn394285018en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:han:dpaper:dp-298en

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