Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/223906
Authors: 
Calsamiglia, Caterina
Martínez-Mora, Francisco
Miralles, Antonio
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13464
Abstract: 
We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal segregation. Transportation costs facilitate the emergence of cardinal segregation as does competition from private schools. Furthermore, the latter renders the best public schools more elitist. The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is resilient to cardinal segregation.
Subjects: 
school choice mechanisms
cardinal segregation
segregation
peer effects
local public goods
JEL: 
I21
H4
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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