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dc.contributor.authorBischoff, Ivoen
dc.contributor.authorGohout, Wolfgangen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:57:54Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:57:54Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22382-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses the accuracy of the tax projections of West German states from a public choice perspective. It argues that state governments have the possibility and face incentives to manipulate tax projections. Evidence for the years 1992 - 2002 reveals a general upward bias in tax projections in election as well as non-election years. The degree of overestimation is higher, the less popular the incumbent party is. Partisanship and elections have no significant influence. To improve external control of state governments in the budget process, the process of tax projections must be made transparent.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aJustus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |cGießenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFinanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere |x74en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelH72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtax projectionsen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical partiesen
dc.subject.keywordbudget processen
dc.subject.keywordpublic expendituresen
dc.titleTax projections in German states – manipulated by opportunistic incumbent parties?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn518816915en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:jlufwa:74en

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