Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/223802 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13360
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We study roughly 11,000 loans from unlicensed moneylenders to over 1,000 borrowers in Singapore and provide basic information about this understudied market. Borrowers frequently expect to repay late. While lenders do rely on additional punishments to enforce loans, the primary cost of not repaying on time is compounding of a very high interest rate. We develop a very simple model of the relational contract between loan sharks and borrowers and use it to predict the effect of a crackdown on illegal moneylending. Consistent with our model, the crackdown raised the interest rate and lowered the size of loans.
Schlagwörter: 
illegal lending
enforcement
relational contract
JEL: 
K42
L14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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