Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22374 
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dc.contributor.authorBischoff, Ivoen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:57:50Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:57:50Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22374-
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a theoretical model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate. The latter consists of numerous groups of dominant-issue-voters who base their voting decision primarily on one issue of the political agenda. Parties follow a lexicographic objective function, aiming to gain power at minimum programmatic concessions. The emerging pattern of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence proposed by the spatial theory of voting. Rather than the centre of the scale of policy preference, its extreme ends, occupied by dominant-issue-voters, attract the policy platforms. The difference in policy platforms is not reduced. The conclusions are found to be compatible with some major empirical findings of the Manifesto Research Group.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aJustus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |cGießenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFinanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere |x68en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordvotersen
dc.subject.keywordincomplete informationen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical partiesen
dc.subject.keywordconvergenceen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Entscheidungen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Parteien
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwMedian Voteren
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleParty competition in a heterogeneous electorate – the role of dominant-issue-voters-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn391198521en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:jlufwa:68en

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