Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/223684
Authors: 
Castillo, Marco
Dickinson, David L.
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13242
Abstract: 
When group outcomes depend on minimal effort (e.g., disease containment, work teams, or indigenous hunt success), a classic coordination problem exists. Using a well-established paradigm, we examine how a common cognitive state (insufficient sleep) impacts coordination outcomes. Our data indicate that insufficient sleep increases coordination failure costs, which suggests that the sleep or, more generally, cognitive composition of a group might determine its ability to escape from a trap of costly miscoordination and wasted cooperative efforts. These findings are first evidence of the potentially large externality of a commonly experienced biological state (insufficient sleep) that has infiltrated many societies.
Subjects: 
coordination games
sleep
cooperative dilemma
JEL: 
C91
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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