Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22356 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers No. 63
Publisher: 
University of Würzburg, Department of Economics, Würzburg
Abstract: 
We investigate how continental European unemployment can be reduced without reducing unemployment benefits and without reducing the net income of low-wage earners. Lower unemployment replacement rates reduce unemployment, the net wage and unemployment benefits. A lower tax on labour increases net wages and - for certain benefit-systems - unemployment benefits as well. Combining these two policies allows to reduce unemployment in countries with "net-Bismarck" and Beveridge systems without reducing net income of workers or the unemployed. Such a policy becomes self-financing under realistic parameter constellations when taxes are reduced only for low-income workers.
Subjects: 
Inequality
Unemployment
Taxation
Policy reform
JEL: 
J51
E60
J38
H23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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