Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22344 
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dc.contributor.authorKrause, Günteren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:57:21Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:57:21Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22344-
dc.description.abstractThe present paper investigates the neglected topic of budgeting rules for public bureaucracies performing governmental activities within predetermined budgets under rules governing expenditure levels and composition. We analyze the optimal budgeting scheme, if the bureaucracy has superior information vis – vis the policymaker. It is tasked with supplying different types of public goods and is subject to costly audits. The optimal budgeting scheme for the bureaucracy is determined. It is shown that it crucially depends on the level of auditing costs. The same holds for the extent of discretion given to the bureaucracy about levels and composition of public expenditures.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Würzburg, Department of Economics |cWürzburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aW.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers |x51en
dc.subject.jelH61en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Finanzplanungen
dc.subject.stwBürokratietheorieen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Finanzkontrolleen
dc.subject.stwKostenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the role of budgeting in the delegated provision of public goods under asymmetric information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn393702758en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wuewep:51en

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