Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22310 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge No. 70
Verlag: 
Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftsordnung und Sozialpolitik, Würzburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Free and competitive insurance markets are not able to provide a system which can be considered economically efficient to deal with the material risks of unemployment. Nor are individual unemployment insurance savings accounts – even when regulated by the state – a superior alternative. If the economic feasibility of an unemployment insurance system is not in itself to be put at risk, coverage must in general be the responsibility of the state. However, the present design of state unemployment insurance can only be regarded as very inefficient and requiring urgent comprehensive reform. An increase in individual freedom and responsibility, as well as more competition are at the heart of a promising modern reform concept which takes into account the specific nature of the risk inherent in unemployment.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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