Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222933 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1884
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We study repayment and delinquency in an innovative loan contract that offers borrowers a wide range of flexibility. Using a large administrative dataset, we perform unsupervised pattern analysis to study how borrowers repay within the framework of this loan. We identify eight clusters that can be grouped into three distinct repayment types. We show that borrowers with fluctuating incomes and limited consumption smoothing resources use the loan's flexibility more and that farmers in particular adjust their repayment to cash flow. Finally, we show that high use of the loan's flexibility is associated with repayment difficulties, yet typically does not result in eventual default; whereas borrowers who face repayment difficulties that are likely driven by economic shocks face a high probability of default.
Schlagwörter: 
flexible loans
loan contracts
repayment
microfinance
JEL: 
D14
G21
C55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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