Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222933 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1884
Publisher: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Abstract: 
We study repayment and delinquency in an innovative loan contract that offers borrowers a wide range of flexibility. Using a large administrative dataset, we perform unsupervised pattern analysis to study how borrowers repay within the framework of this loan. We identify eight clusters that can be grouped into three distinct repayment types. We show that borrowers with fluctuating incomes and limited consumption smoothing resources use the loan's flexibility more and that farmers in particular adjust their repayment to cash flow. Finally, we show that high use of the loan's flexibility is associated with repayment difficulties, yet typically does not result in eventual default; whereas borrowers who face repayment difficulties that are likely driven by economic shocks face a high probability of default.
Subjects: 
flexible loans
loan contracts
repayment
microfinance
JEL: 
D14
G21
C55
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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