Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222659 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No. 40/2020
Verlag: 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the relationship between the transparency of loan loss provision disclosures and the provisioning practices of privately held banks. We study a unique change in disclosure regulation under German banking law which introduces mandatory disclosures of loan loss provisions. Using proprietary data provided by the national supervisor, we are able to observe provisioning practices before and after disclosure becomes mandatory. Our findings suggest that bank managers use loan loss provisions to a lesser extent for income smoothing once they are required to disclose their accounting choice. At the same time, provisions become more informative about future loan losses. The change comes in the absence of capital market pressure and highlights the role of depositors and public pressure in the monitoring of bank managers. We exploit cross-sectional variation and show that the change is associated with differences in the local information environment and banks' funding structure.
Schlagwörter: 
Loan Loss Provisions
Public Disclosure
Privately Held Banks
Earnings Smoothing
Market Discipline
JEL: 
G21
G28
M41
M48
ISBN: 
978-3-95729-744-0
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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