Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222644 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Vereinte Nationen: Zeitschrift für die Vereinten Nationen und ihre Sonderorganisationen [ISSN:] 2366-6773 [Volume:] 65 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen [Place:] Berlin [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 159-163
Publisher: 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen, Berlin
Abstract: 
Nach den Terroranschlägen am 11. September 2001 in New York ergriff der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen Maßnahmen, die grundlegende Verfahrensrechte missachteten. Erst nach fast zehn Jahren wurde die Praxis schrittweise rechtsstaatlichen Prinzipien unterworfen. Dieser Beitrag analysiert den politischen Konflikt zwischen Befürwortern und Gegnern des Sanktionsregimes.
Abstract (Translated): 
In the wake of 9/11, the UN Security Council adopted emergency measures, the so-called ‘terror lists’, which violated basic due process rights of the targeted persons. It took almost a decade before the regime of individual sanctions was gradually subjected to principles of due process. Since the most powerful members of the Council profited from the regime’s executive discretion, they eagerly defended it against external attempts at its containment. Only when the critics enlisted other international organizations, in particular the European Court of Justice, were they able to turn the tides. Yet, the resulting institutional checks on the Council are both incomplete and risking negative side effects.
Subjects: 
Terrorismus
Sicherheitsrat
Sanktionen
Menschenrechte
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)

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