Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/222570
Authors: 
Lichand, Guilherme
Wolf, Sharon
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 357
Abstract: 
Teacher absenteeism and shirking are common problems in developing countries. While monitoring teachers should ameliorate those problems, mobilizing parents to do so often leads to small or even negative effects on learning outcomes. This paper provides causal evidence that this might result from non-monotonic effects of monitoring teachers. Cross-randomizing nudges to teachers and parents in Ivory Coast - to motivate and monitor teachers directly, and to mobilize parents -, we find that in schools where either parents or teachers are nudged, student dropouts decrease by nearly 50%. In contrast, in schools where both are nudged, there is no effect on dropouts.
Subjects: 
moral hazard
monitoring
education
teachers
JEL: 
C93
D23
D91
I25
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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