Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222478 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Political Science Review [ISSN:] 0192-5121 [Volume:] 40 [Issue:] 5 [Publisher:] Sage [Place:] Thousand Oaks [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 643-658
Publisher: 
Sage, Thousand Oaks
Abstract: 
Does the geographical concentration of ethnic minorities influence their descriptive representation in closed-list systems? Counterintuitive to the idea that single-member district electoral rules are necessary for minorities’ geographical representation, we argue that, in closed-list systems, parties are incentivised to allocate promising list positions to those minority candidates who are based in geographical areas where minorities concentrate. Empirically, we provide a case study of the list positions of dual candidates of immigrant origin running in the German mixed-member system in 2013. Results show a relationship between the list positions of candidates of immigrant origin and geographical concentrations of immigrant-origin residents.
Subjects: 
descriptive representation
mixed-member systems
immigrant-origin candidates
geographical concentrations
ethnic minorities
closed-list systems
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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