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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 018
Verlag: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
We document that central banks are significantly more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits, especially amid greater political pressure, the public’s receptiveness to more extreme political views, and when governors are reappointable. The propensity to report small profits over small losses is correlated with more lenient monetary policy and higher inflation. We conclude that profitability concerns, although absent from standard theory, are present and effective in practice. These findings inform a debate about the political economy of central banking, monetary stability, and the effectiveness of non-traditional central banking.
Schlagwörter: 
Central Banks
Profitability
Non-Traditional Central Banking
Monetary Stability
JEL: 
E58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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