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dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique M.en
dc.contributor.authorBental, Benjaminen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:54:28Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:54:28Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22214-
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a transactions cost theory of total factor productivity. In a world with asymmetric information and transactions costs, effort, and thus productivity, must be induced by incentive schemes. Labor contracts trade off the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of effort. The latter include, in addition to the workers? marginal disutility of effort, also organizational costs and rents. As the economy grows, the optimal contracts change endogenously, inducing higher effort and measured productivity. Transactions costs are also affected by societal characteristics that determine the power of incentive contracts. Therefore, differences in these characteristics may explain cross-economy productivity differences. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the model is consistent both with time series and cross-country observations.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Center for Applied Statistics and Economics (CASE) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPapers |x2004,41en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelO40en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen
dc.subject.keywordtotal factor productivityen
dc.subject.keywordeconomic growthen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwProduktivitäten
dc.subject.stwTransaktionskostenen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleIncentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn495857858en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:caseps:200441en

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