Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22214
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dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBental, Benjaminen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:54:28Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:54:28Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22214-
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a transactions cost theory of total factor productivity. In a world with asymmetric information and transactions costs, effort, and thus productivity, must be induced by incentive schemes. Labor contracts trade off the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of effort. The latter include, in addition to the workers? marginal disutility of effort, also organizational costs and rents. As the economy grows, the optimal contracts change endogenously, inducing higher effort and measured productivity. Transactions costs are also affected by societal characteristics that determine the power of incentive contracts. Therefore, differences in these characteristics may explain cross-economy productivity differences. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the model is consistent both with time series and cross-country observations.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPapers / Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Center for Applied Statistics and Economics (CASE) |x2004,41en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelO40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtotal factor productivityen_US
dc.subject.keywordeconomic growthen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktivitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTransaktionskostenen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleIncentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn495857858en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:caseps:200441-

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