Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/222139
Authors: 
Backhoff-Veraguas, Julio
Beißner, Patrick
Horst, Ulrich
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper 242
Abstract: 
We consider a general framework of optimal mechanism design under adverse selection and ambiguity about the type distribution of agents. We prove the existence of optimal mechanisms under minimal assumptions on the contract space and prove that centralized contracting implemented via mechanisms is equivalent to delegated contracting implemented via a contract menu under these assumptions. Our abstract existence results are applied to a series of applications that include models of optimal risk sharing and of optimal portfolio delegation.
Subjects: 
robust contracts
nonmetrizable contract spaces
ambiguity
financial markets
JEL: 
C02
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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