Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/222085
Authors: 
Biró, Péter
Gudmundsson, Jens
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CERS-IE Working Papers No. CERS-IE WP - 2020/16
Abstract: 
We allocate objects to agents as exemplified primarily by school choice. Welfare judgments of the object-allocating agency are encoded as edge weights in the acceptability graph. The welfare of an allocation is the sum of its edge weights. We introduce the constrained welfare-maximizing solution, which is the allocation of highest welfare among the Pareto-efficient allocations. We identify conditions under which this solution is easily determined from a computational point of view. For the unrestricted case, we formulate an integer program and find this to be viable in practice as it quickly solves a real-world instance of kindergarten allocation and large-scale simulated instances. Incentives to report preferences truthfully are discussed briefly.
Subjects: 
Assignment
Pareto-efficiency
Welfare-maximization
Complexity
Integer programming
JEL: 
C6
C78
D61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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