Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222061 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2019/14
Publisher: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Abstract: 
We study linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nucleolus and investigatethe reduction possibilities in their computation. We slightly extend some well-known related results and establish their counterparts by using the dual game. Our main results imply, for example, that if the core of the game is not empty, all dually inessential coalitions (which can be weakly minorized by a partition in the dual game) can be ignored when we compute the per-capita least core and the per-capita (pre)nucleolus from the dual game. This could lead to the design of polynomial time algorithms for the per-capita (and other monotone nondecreasingly weighted versions of the) least core and the (pre)nucleolus in specific classes of balanced games with polynomial many dually essential coalitions.
Subjects: 
nucleolus
least core
weighted nucleoli
efficient computation
cooperative game
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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