Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222018 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2018/5
Publisher: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Abstract: 
We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers (customers) and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (Stuart, 1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).
Subjects: 
Bargaining set
core
matching market
assignment game
cooperative game
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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