Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221647
Authors: 
Myerson, Roger B.
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1291
Abstract: 
This paper is a preliminary draft of an article to appear in Chicago Law Review (2000), as part of a symposium reviewing two new books on economic analysis of constitutions: Dennis Mueller's Constitutional Democracy and Robert Cooter's Strategic Constitution. Some of the basic questions of constitutional analysis are introduced, and the importance of work in this area is shown as one of the major new developments in social theory. The methods of economic theory are then shown to be particularly appropriate and useful for such constitutional analysis. The author then tries to follow Cooter and Mueller in sketching some of the most important results of economic analysis of constitutional structures, but finds a perspective quite different from theirs.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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