Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221640
Authors: 
Fauli-Oller, Ramon
Sandonis, Joel
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1284
Abstract: 
The optimal merger policy when efficiency gains are not merger specific but can also be achieved through licensing is derived in a differentiated goods Cournot duopoly. We show that whenever both royalties and fees are feasible instruments to license technology, mergers should not be allowed, which fits the prescription of the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines. When only one instrument is feasible, however, the possibility of licensing cannot be used as a definitive argument against mergers.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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