Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221631
Authors: 
Squintani, Francesco
Valimaki, Juuso
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1275
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the equilibrium play in a random matching model with a changing environment. Under myopic decision making, players adopt imitation strategies similar to those observed in evolutionary models with sampling from past play in the population. If the players are patient, equilibrium strategies display elements of experimentation in addition to imitation. If the changes in the environment are infrequent enough, these strategies succeed in coordinating almost all of the players on the dominant action almost all of the time. The myopic rules, on the other hand, result in mis-coordination for a positive fraction of time.
JEL: 
C73
D83
D84
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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