Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221614 
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1258
Publisher: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Abstract: 
We study stopping games in the setup of Neveu. We prove the existence of a uniform value (in a sense defined below), by allowing the players to use randomized strategies. In contrast with previous work, we make no comparison assumption on the payoff processes. Moreover, we prove that the value is the limit of discounted values, and we construct e-optimal strategies.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.