Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221609 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1253
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a network of roads) based on the report of agents' symmetric, single-peaked preferences over points on that graph. We show that while a strategy-poof, onto rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle on the graph grants one agent a certain amount of decisive power. This result surprisingly characterizes the class of strategy-proof, onto rules both in terms of a certain subclass of such rules for trees and in terms of a parameterized set of generalized median voter schemes.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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