Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221609
Authors: 
Schummer, James
Vohra, Rakesh V.
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1253
Abstract: 
We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a network of roads) based on the report of agents' symmetric, single-peaked preferences over points on that graph. We show that while a strategy-poof, onto rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle on the graph grants one agent a certain amount of decisive power. This result surprisingly characterizes the class of strategy-proof, onto rules both in terms of a certain subclass of such rules for trees and in terms of a parameterized set of generalized median voter schemes.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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