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Al-Najjar, Nabil I.
Smorodinsky, Rann
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper 1250
Saborian [8], following Green [4], studies a class of repeated games where a player's payoff depends on his stage action and an anonymous aggregate outcome, and shows that long-run players behave myopically in any equilibrium of such games. In this paper we extend Sabourian's results to games where the aggregate outcome is not necessarily an anonymous function of players' actions, and where players strategies may depend non-anonymously on signals of other players' behavior. Our argument also provides a conceptually simpler proof of Green and Sabourian's analysis, showing how their basic result is driven by bounds on how many pivotal players there can be in a game.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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