Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221598
Authors: 
Myerson, Roger B.
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1242
Abstract: 
We show how nonsymmetric politicization can rise in a democracy where voters are distributed across several ex-ante symmetric sectors. The voters are uncertain about the administrative ability of an elected official. they observe the quality of her performance, which depends on her ability and her effort. the official can allocate her efforts symmetrically or nonsymmetrically across sectors. We show the existence of a nonsymmetric equilibrium, in which the official allocates mroe effort to administering one critical sector, becqause voters in other sectors rationally respond less to what they observe about the quality of to her administration.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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