Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221588
Authors: 
Diermeier, Daniel
Merlo, Antonio
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1232
Abstract: 
In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2) Cabinet replacements; (3) Early elections; (4) Surplus governments; (5) Minority governments; (6) The relative instability of minority governments.
Subjects: 
government stability
minority coalitions
surplus coalitions
JEL: 
D72
H19
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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