Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221570
Authors: 
Myerson, Roger B.
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1214
Abstract: 
Scoring rules are compared by the equilibria that they generate for simple elections with three candidates and voters drawn from large Poisson distributions. A calculus for comparing pivot probabilities in Poisson voting games is applied. For a symmetric Condorcet cycle, nonsymmetric discriminatory equilibria exist under best-rewarding scoring rules like plurality voting. A candidate who is universally disliked may still not be out of contention under worst-punishing scoring rules like negative-plurality voting. In elections where two of three candidates have the same position, symmetric equilibria coincide with majority rule only for scoring rules that are balanced between best-rewarding and worst-punishing. When voters also care about continuous functions of vote shares, equilibria may still depend on pivot probabilites.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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