Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221561 
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1205
Publisher: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Abstract: 
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. In this paper we provide an implementation "folk theorem": for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.