Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221553
Authors: 
Kajii, Atsushi
Morris, Stephen
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1197
Abstract: 
This paper presents a simple framework that allows us to survey and relate some different strands of the game theory literature. We describe a "canonical" way of adding incomplete information to a complete information game. This framework allows us to give a simple "complete theory" interpretation (Kreps 1990) of standard normal form refinements such as perfection, and to relate refinements both to the "higher order beliefs literature" (Rubinstein 1989; Monderer and Samet 1989; Morris, Rob and Shin, 1995; Kajii and Morris 1995) and the "payoff uncertainty approach" (Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine 1988; Dekel and Fudenberg 1990).
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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