Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221545
Authors: 
Myerson, Roger B.
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1189
Abstract: 
Existence of equilibria is proven for Poisson games with compact type sets and finite action sets. Then three theorems are introduced for characterizing limits of probabilities in Poisson games when the expected number of players becomes large. The magnitude theorem characterizes the rate at which probabilities of events go zero. The offset theorem characterizes the ratios of probabilites of events that differ by a finite additive translation. The hyperplane theorem estimates probabilites of hyperplane events. These theorems are applied to derive formulas for pivot probabilities in binary elections, and to analyze a voting game that was studied by Ledyard.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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