Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221504
Autoren: 
Bagwell, Kyle
Ramey, Garey
Datum: 
1995
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1148
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers pricing, cost-reducing investment and dissipative advertising by firms when consumers acquire price information via two information channels, observation of advertising and sequential price search. We find that advertising guides consumers to the lowest prices in the market, even when consumers have the option to search. The threat of search by advertising-uninformed consumers introduces price competition among firms, giving short-and long-run resolutions to the Diamond paradox. Higher concentration raises welfare as a consequence of coordination economies. An extension to loss-leader advertising is developed.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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