Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221478
Autoren: 
Maruta, Toshimasa
Datum: 
1995
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1122
Zusammenfassung: 
In a 2 x2 symmetric game with two symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, one risk-dominates another if and only if the equilibrium strategy is a unique best response to any mixture that gives it at least a probability of one half. In a n x n symmetric game, we call a strategy globally risk-dominant if it is a unique best response to any mixture that gives it at least a probability of one half. We show that if a finite coordination game has a globally risk-dominant equilibrium then this is the one that is selected by the stochastic equilibrium selection processes proposed by Young and by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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