Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221467 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1994
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1111
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
A central political and decision science issue is to understand how election outcomes can change with the choice of a procedure or the slate of candidates. These questions are answered for the important Copeland method (CM) where, with a geometric approach, we characterize all relationships among the rankings of positional voting methods and the CM. Then, we characterize all ways CM rankings can vary as candidates enter or leave the election. In this manner new CM strengths and flaws are detected.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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